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INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the root causes and pervasive impact of the 
subprime mortgage market meltdown1 and the subsequent global financial 
crisis. 2 It seeks to demonstrate that government responses to the crisis, both 
in terms of timing and in terms of substance, neglected small business oper-
ations and community banks, which continued to feel the impact of the 
meltdown. 3 The Article concludes that supervisory and regulatory authority 
exists to address these concerns and needs to be invoked effectively.4 
* Distinguished Professor and Scholar, University of the Pacific McGeorge School 
of Law. J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Georgetown University. Copyright© 2011 
Michael P. Malloy. Some portions of this Article are derived from a forthcoming supplement 
to MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION (3 vols., 2d ed., Aspen Publishers, 
2011). I wish to thank the Western New England University School of Law and especially 
Professor Eric J. Gouvin, Director, Law and Business Center for Advancing Entrepreneur-
ship at Western New England, for their kind invitation to present an earlier version of this 
Article as part of the 2011-2012 Speakers Series. 
1. On the subprime mortgage market meltdown, see MICHAEL P. MALLOY, 
ANATOMY OF A MELTDOWN (2010). 
2. See infra Part I. On the global financial crisis that emerged in the wake of the 
U.S. subprime mortgage market meltdown, see 3 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND 
REGULATION§ 15.06 (2d ed. 2011). 
3. See infra Part II. 
4. See infra Part III. 
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I. ROOT CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
A. The Subprime Mortgage Meltdown 
The financial crisis that has persisted since 2008 is now often referred 
to generically as the "Great Recession," but this is no more than a clever 
label suggesting a connection between the current situation and the Great 
Depression of 1929-1935. The grim reality is, of course, that there is a com-
plex of causes that contributed to the present financial crisis, and sorting 
them out will be a formidable task.5 Acknowledging the subtleties of the 
problem should not distract us from the central narrative of the crisis6-that 
unrestrained marketing of certain financial services morphed into a capital 
markets failure in the United States and eventually into a transnational dis-
aster. To begin with, then, it is worthwhile to pluck out those narrative 
strands that may lead us to the root causes of the crisis, which may then 
enhance our understanding of the continuing impact of the crisis on small 
business. 
In the early 2000s,7 mortgage loan originators began to make residen-
tial mortgage loans based on lower underwriting standards, often referred to 
as subprime loans.8 In the first half of the decade, there were no apparent 
5. For a very useful preliminary analysis of those causes, see Oren Bar-Gill, The 
Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
1073 (2009). 
6. Congress, for example, seems to be in danger of losing sight of that central 
narrative, as legislative debate turns to the possible economic harm that previous congres-
sional responses to the crisis may impede recovery by imposing burdensome externalities on 
business growth. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Dodd-Frank Act a Favorite Target for Republi-
cans Laying Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2011, at B I (reporting on political arguments 
characterizing post-meltdown reform legislation as "government overreach that is killing 
jobs."). 
7. Portions of this discussion are based upon the Federal Housing Finance Board's 
remarks concerning the subprime mortgage crisis in connection with its proposal to establish 
affordable housing homeownership set-aside programs, for the purpose of refinancing or 
restructuring eligible nontraditional or subprime owner-occupied mortgage loans. Affordable 
Housing Program Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg. 20,552, 20,552-53 (proposed Apr. 16, 2008); 
Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 
36,212 (proposed June 25, 2008). 
8. In general, a subprime loan may be understood as a "residential mortgage loan[] 
based on lower underwriting standards." 2 MALLOY, supra note 2, at 6-38. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission has characterized subprime loans according to the following features 
a mortgage loan that does not conform to the underwriting standards required for 
sale to the government sponsored enterprises (non-conforming loans) and are made 
to borrowers who: (I) have weakened credit histories such as payment delinquen-
cies, charge-offs, judgments, and bankruptcies; (2) have reduced repayment capaci-
ty as measured by credit scores (e.g., FICO), debt-to-income ratios, loan-to-value 
rations, or other criteria; (3) have not provided documentation to verify all or some 
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negative repercussions from this increasingly common lending practice, but 
by mid-2006 "home values had leveled off and were beginning to decline."9 
This trend led to a gradual increase in delinquencies and defaults in sub-
prime mortgage loans. 10 This increase in subprime loan delinquencies and 
defaults had substantial adverse effects on the market for securities backed 
by subprime loans and on the collateralized debt obligations (COOs) linked 
to such loans. 11 
The situation was further exacerbated by the adjustable rate feature 
that was characteristic of the subprime mortgages. 12 Not surprisingly per-
haps, the interest rates on subprime ARMs and other nontraditional mort-
gages increased substantially over time. 13 As these mortgages reset, many of 
the mortgagors confronted "an unaffordable increase in their mortgage 
of the information, particularly financial information, in their loan applications; or 
(4) have any combination of these factors. 
Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 
36,212,36,212 n.l (2009). 
9. /d. at 36,212. 
10. Id. (citing Testimony of John C. Dugan Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, !lOth Cong. 8-12 (2008) (testimony of John C. Dugan, Comp-
troller of the Currency)); The State of the Banking Industry Before U.S. S. Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, !lOth Cong. 5-6 (2008) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, 
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.). 
II. Id. at 36,212. 
12. See Affordable Housing Program Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg. 20,552, 20,552-53. 
According to the Federal Housing Finance Board, typical features of subprime adjustable 
rate mortgages (ARMs) include: 
"2/28" and "3/27" loans, in which the [mortgagor] pays an introductory, often a 
low "teaser" interest rate, fixed for the first two or three years, after which the rate 
becomes adjustable, usually on an annual basis. Principal and interest payments in-
crease because they are typically "recast" on two common types of nontraditional 
loans: Interest-only loans and option ARMs. For an interest-only loan, the [mort-
gagor] pays only interest for a specified period, e.g., five years. Payments are then 
recast to include the loan's principal, which is amortized over the remaining term 
of the loan. With an option ARM, the [mortgagor] has the monthly option of pay-
ing less than the fully amortizing principal and interest payment, and it may pay as 
little as a minimum payment that includes no principal and less than the full 
amount of interest. Unpaid interest is added to the loan balance resulting in "nega-
tive amortization." In most option ARMs, the lender recasts the payment to re-
amortize the increased principal and interest either periodically, e.g., every 5 years, 
or whenever the negative amortization reaches a specified cap, typically 125% of 
the original loan amount. Nontraditional loans may have adjustable interest rates, 
which can compound the increase in the amount of the monthly payments and the 
amount of negative amortization. 
!d. at 20,553 n.l. 
13. /d. at 20,553 ("About 1.5 million subprime ARMs [were] scheduled to reset 
upward in 2008." (citing Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Fostering Sustaina-
ble Homeownership, at the National Community Reinvestment Coalition Annual Meeting 
(Mar. 14, 2008))). 
10 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:7 
payments."14 Many were "not able to sustain homeownership without are-
duction in their monthly mortgage payments.''15 However, given current 
market conditions, subprime mortgagors found themselves in a position 
where they could neither sell the property and pay off the subprime loan, 
nor refinance the property in a more affordable mortgage arrangement, be-
cause there was insufficient equity in the property to make sale or refinanc-
ing feasible. 16 This phenomenon of "payment shock"' 7-high cost-to-
income ratio and an inability to liquidate or refinance-increasingly led to 
foreclosure as the only option available to many mortgagors. "More than 20 
percent of the roughly 3.6 million subprime ARMs outstanding at the end of 
2007 either were in foreclosure or [were] 90 days or more past due."18 
Geographic concentration of subprime mortgages further exacerbated 
the economic crisis in regions of the country. 19 Large numbers of foreclosed 
and unoccupied properties would as a result negatively affect property val-
ues throughout entire neighborhoods.20 Beyond the subprime problem, how-
ever, as the crisis deepened in the last three quarters of 2008, mortgage 
foreclosures and delinquencies in lower-risk prime loans more than dou-
bled.21 
What gradually became apparent was that these foreclosures were not 
isolated incidents but part of a systemic breakdown in the mortgage mar-
ket. 22 In another context, I have described the system that eventually failed 
as 
an "origination-to-distribution" model of debt securitization, a mark-to-market sys-
tem, believed to be a more robust way of spreading risk than the more conservative 
investment analysis of the 1960s. While the subprime mortgage market emerged as 
a result of aggressive marketing by non-bank lenders such as "lightly regulated" 
14. /d. at 20,553; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC 
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2008 TO 2018 23 (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc. 
cfm?index=8917&type=l (estimating subprime-related losses). 
15. Affordable Housing Program Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg. at 20,553. 
16. For a description of the broad impact of subprime foreclosures on the economy, 
see Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks by Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Current 
Housing and Mortgage Market Developments Georgetown University Law Center (Oct. 16, 
2007), available at http://www. treasury .gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp612.aspx. 
17. See Bar-Gill, supra note 5, at 1076 (discussing "payment shock"). 
18. Affordable Housing Program Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg. at 20,553; see also 
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Fostering Sustainable Homeownership, at the 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition Annual Meeting (Mar. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080314a.htm. 
19. Affordable Housing Program Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg. at 20,553. 
20. /d. 
21. Mike Ferullo, Regulators Finds More Prime Mortgages Under Stress, Problems 
With Modifications, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 3, 2009, at D24. 
22. See Michael P. Malloy, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Bank Regulation, 
BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP., Mar. 1, 2008, at 1-2 (discussing systemic aspects of 
sub prime mortgage crisis). 
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mortgage finance companies (MFCs) to less credit-worthy borrowers, larger depos-
itory institutions responded to the increased MFC market share by easing credit 
standards, often through state-chartered MFC subsidiaries. Lenders of all types 
vigorously sold these loan products to subprime mortgagors, and then packaged the 
portfolios of mortgages into such securitized products as collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs) that were analyzed and rated by credit rating agencies and marketed 
to institutional investors by investments banks. Securitization of these portfolios 
ameliorated lending risk, and the net proceeds of CDO placements provided lend-
ers with funding to expand the subprime mortgage market itself. The cycle contin-
ued to operate, expanding as it drew more investors into the system and encour-
aged ever-increasing competition for subprime products and programs. When the 
cycle eventually wobbled--as the inherent counterparty risk manifested itself in 
the inability of the mortgagors to sustain markedly increasing levels of indebted-
ness---the system began to break down as the value of the CDO portfolios dramati-
cally contracted. 23 
11 
The failure of this market has led to more than waves of foreclosures 
and losses for the financial institutions tied to the system. 24 The failure has 
also called into question the efficacy of basic regulatory programs intended 
to support safety and soundness in banking. For example, the chair of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Bank for International Set-
tlements25 suggested that bank capital adequacy requirements,26 newly re-
vised at the time under the auspices of the Basel Committee itself, might 
need to be reevaluated. 27 In fact, a lengthening series of delays has ensued in 
light of the collapse of the capital markets/8 and the revised requirements 
have yet to be implemented.29 
23. !d. at I. 
24. See Daniel Pruzin, Subprime Crisis Signals Need for More Work on Capital 
Accord, Basel Panel Head Says, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar. 6, 2008, at Dl3 (discussing 
U.S. banking sector losses). 
25. On the role of the Basel Committee in the establishment of international capital 
adequacy standards, see 3 MALLOY, supra note 2, § 15.02[C][l]. 
26. On capital adequacy requirements, see 2 MALLOY, supra note 2, § 7.03[C][4]. 
27. See, e.g., Pruzin, supra note 24 (reporting on public remarks by Basel Commit-
tee Chair, Nout Wellink). 
28. See, e.g., Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Market Risk, 76 Fed. Reg. 1890 (Jan. 
II, 2011) (proposing revisions to market risk capital rules); BASEL COMMITIEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR: CONSULTATIVE 
DOCUMENT (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs 164.pdf (proposing changes to 
definition of capital, introduction of leverage ratio, and changes to treatment of counterparty 
credit risk); BASEL COMMITIEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REVISIONS TO THE BASEL II 
MARKET RISK FRAMEWORK (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl48.pdf (dis-
cussing changes); Capital Adequacy Guidelines: Trust Preferred Securities and the Definition 
of Capital; Delay of Implementation Date, 74 Fed. Reg. 12,076 (Mar. 23, 2009) (announcing 
decision of Federal Reserve Board to delay implementation of Basel revisions). 
29. See BASEL COMMITIEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PROGRESS REPORT ON BASEL 
III IMPLEMENTATION (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbs203.pdf (indicating 
United States lagging in adopting regulatory requirements under existing Basel II accord as 
well as recently adopted Basel 2.5 and Base! III supplementary agreements). 
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What may be most revealing about initial governmental responses to 
the crisis, however, is the relative lack of attention to its impact on individu-
als and small businesses. At first, the U.S. Government seemed to deny that 
there was a crisis. For example, in April 2008, Federal Reserve chairman 
Ben Bemanke was still suggesting that "[t]hese problems notwithstanding, 
the originate-to-distribute model has proven effective in the past and with 
adequate repairs, could be so in the future."30 Throughout the first half of 
2008, U.S. regulatory response to the subprime crisis was inconsequential, 
consisting only of"guidance" to lenders.31 
It reveals much about the regulators' collective responses that it was 
not the mortgage crisis itself, as it affected borrowers, that prodded the 
regulators into action, but the near failure of investment firms involved in 
the CDO market. Historically, U.S. regulators have characteristically been 
slow to respond to financial deprivation affecting retail consumers but 
prompt to support large institutional participants in the financial markets. 
Thus, on March 13, 2008, when Bear Steams & Co. Inc. saw its liquidity 
fall from approximately $12.4 billion to $2 billion as a result o(the dissipa-
tion of the market's confidence in the firm and the refusal of its counterpar-
ties to act, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department swiftly facili-
tated a loan to Bear Steams through bank holding company JPMorgan 
Chase & Co.32 This was followed by a loan to JPMorgan to support its out-
right acquisition of Bear Steams at a price of $2.00 per share (later raised to 
$10.00).33 
Attention to those aspects of the crisis affecting home mortgage bor-
rowers did not receive such swift attention, and it is here that we can discern 
a linkage to small business performance. Not only was the small business 
sector impacted by the general effects of the significant economic downturn, 
but it also began to lose access to a traditional funding source-personal 
credit of small business principals and lines of credit linked to residential 
30. Jeff Day, Bernanke Touts Fed's Action in Credit Crunch, Contrasts It With 
1929's Passive Central Bank, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 11, 2008, available at 
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/bna!bbd.nsf/eh/ AOB6H3F9T2 (quoting Chairman Bernanke ). 
31. See, e.g., Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569 (July 
I 0, 2007) (Interagency Statement) (providing interagency guidance "to clarify how [ deposi-
tory] institutions [could] offer certain adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) products in safe and 
sound manner"); Final Guidance-Illustrations of Consumer Information for Hybrid Adjusta-
ble Rate Mortgage Products, 73 Fed. Reg. 30,997 (May 29, 2008) (publishing four docu-
ments that set forth illustrations "intended to assist institutions in implementing the consumer 
protection portion of," and "in providing information to consumers on hybrid [ARM] prod-
ucts as recommended by," the Interagency Statement). 
32. Aaron Lorenzo, Regulators Defend Bear Stearns Decision; Senators Ask If Fed 
Needs Additional Powers, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 4, 2008, at D9. 
33. Aaron Lorenzo, New York Fed, JPMorgan Chase Agree on Details in Deal for 
Bear Stearns, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar. 25,2008, available at http://www.bna.com. 
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mortgages of the principals.34 It was not until the very end of April2008 that 
a bipartisan housing stimulus package could be scheduled for legislative 
consideration in the Senate.35 Even here there was little agreement between 
the House and Senate as to the appropriate way to address the crisis as it 
affected countless citizens. The House Ways and Means Committee empha-
sized home-buyer tax credits,36 while the House Financial Services Commit-
tee considered a foreclosure prevention bill, H.R. 3221, that included au-
thorization for wholesale refinancing of mortgages in danger of default, a 
provision much maligned by White House policy advisers.37 By late July 
2008, however, the legislative tide had turned decisively in favor of H.R. 
3221, with the passage of the bill in the House by a substantial margin and 
Senate passage expected. 38 
Of course, the subprime mortgage crisis is not just about the personal 
financial tragedies triggered by improvident mortgage lending. Fueling the 
dramatic expansion of this sector was the facility of the investment markets 
in securitizing these mortgages into CDOs sold to a wide range of institu-
tional investors.39 The existence of the CDO market had the apparent effect 
of moderating the risk of lenders and feeding their liquidity levels, with the 
result that the subprime mortgage market experienced growth at significant 
rates.40 The poor quality of the underlying mortgage obligations has now 
had serious adverse effects on the value of CDO portfolios, to the great dis-
tress of many institutional investors. 41 The Chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission made it clear during remarks at a February 2008 
conference42 that the Commission was investigating possible securities fraud 
34. See, e.g., David D. Chait, Small Business Financing and the Post-2008 Credit 
Paradigm: the US. Small Business Administration and Key Factors to Support Traditional 
Credit Markets, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 411, 417 (20 II) ("[S]mall businesses faced 
a new world in 2008 with increasing cost of capital as well as tightening credit standards, 
coupled with decreased housing values and uncertain sales."). 
35. Thecla Fabian, Senate Starts Housing Stimulus Debate; Bankruptcy Amendment 
on indefinite Hold, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 7, 2008, at D9. 
36. Heather M. Rothman, Ways and Means Set to Consider $11 Billion Housing Tax 
Measure, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 9, 2008, at Dll. 
37. Richard Cowden, Frank, White House Advisers Exchange Barbs over Features 
of Foreclosure Prevention Bill, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. II, 2008, at DIO. 
38. Mike Ferullo, House Approves Massive Housing Aid Bill with Financial Back-
stop for Fannie, Freddie, BNA BANKING DAILY, July 24,2008, at 015. 
39. Chait, supra note 34, at 416. 
40. /d. at415. 
41. See id. at 416 ("[E]xposure to these products extended deep into the financial 
system, leading to fundamental changes in the entire market as defaults grew."). 
42. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks to the 'SEC 
Speaks in 2008' Program of the Practicing Law Institute: the SEC Agenda for 2008 (Feb. 8, 
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch020808cc.htm. 
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and breaches of fiduciary duty in the marketing of CD0s.43 In its investiga-
tion, the Commission was considering whether the banking enterprises that 
packaged the mortgages and the securities firms that marketed the CDOs 
made appropriate public disclosures concerning the valuation of CDOs and 
the risks involved.44 By June 2008, these investigations had already resulted 
in civil charges by the Commission,45 and criminal indictments,46 against 
two former portfolio managers in the asset management division of Bear 
Stearns. Nevertheless, it was not until a March 2008 Senate Banking Com-
mittee hearing that the regulators grudgingly admitted that they had not 
"fully appreciated all [the] risks out there" and acknowledged the gravity of 
the dramatic reductions in bank earnings, the mounting foreclosures, and the 
difficulties still to be faced in restoring liquidity in the credit markets.47 
The broadened responses of the Administration and the regulators still 
tended to be somewhat unfocused. With much fanfare, the Administration 
announced in mid-March 2008 proposed measures intended to prevent a 
future financial crisis, rather than to respond to the present one.48 These 
measures represented a call to states and market participants to tighten mar-
ket supervision. Thus, states were urged to establish nationwide licensing 
standards for MFCs, while lenders would be required to improve the quality 
of the disclosure that they provide to borrowers about payment terms, and 
stronger conflict-of-interest rules would apply to credit rating agencies that 
assess the risk of CDO offerings. 49 The proposals were widely dismissed as 
ineffective and limited, though they were praised by industry representa-
tives.50 
43. Rachel McTague, Cox Outlines SEC Agenda for 2008, Including Initiatives 
Related to Subprime, BNA BANKING DAILY, Feb. II, 2008, at D I 0. 
44. !d. In addition, one can expect the Commission to consider whether broker-
dealers complied with suitability requirements in selling COOs and other debt-related deriva-
tives to their customers. !d. 
45. Complaint at 1-4, SEC v. Cioffi, 2008 WL 4693320 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008) 
(No. 08CV2457), 2008 WL 2446253. 
46. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Cioffi, 2008 WL 2448463 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 
18, 2008) (No. 08CR00415). 
47. Richard Cowden, Senators Grill Financial Regulators on Failure To Supervise 
Banks During Mortgage Crisis, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar. 5, 2008, available at 
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/bna/bbd.nsf/eh/AOB6D6Q7UI (quoting Federal Reserve Governor, 
Donald Kohn). 
48. See Stephen Labaton, White House Offers Plan To Ward Off Credit Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 14,2008, at AI. 
49. !d. 
50. !d. By contrast, the SEC has proposed additional requirements on "nationally 
recognized statistical rating organizations" to deal with "concerns about the integrity of their 
credit rating procedures" and methods for determining COO credit ratings linked to subprime 
mortgages. Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 
Fed. Reg. 36,212 (June 25, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b). 
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At the same time, the regulators were initiating modest tweaks to the 
system to address the crisis. In March 2008, for example, the OCC issued an 
interim final rule to add a provision to the lending limits regulation that ad-
dressed temporary funding arrangements in emergency situations such as 
critical financial markets stability.51 The rule enabled the OCC to establish a 
special lending limit for loans and extensions of credit if it determined that 
such loans and extensions of credit (i) were "essential to address an emer-
gency"; (ii) would be relatively short in duration; (iii) would decrease in 
amount on a schedule and in a manner acceptable to the OCC; and, (iv) 
would "not present unacceptable risk" to the lending national bank.52 Given 
these predicate conditions, it is understandable that the rule mandated su-
pervisory oversight and reporting requirements that the OCC determined to 
be appropriate to monitor compliance with the conditions.53 The rule was 
effective March 20, 2008, with comments due by April 21, 2008.54 Similar-
ly, in April 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Board proposed an amend-
ment to its Affordable Housing Program (AHP) authorizing the FHLBanks 
to establish set-aside programs to refinance or restructure nontraditional or 
subprime owner-occupied mortgage loans of eligible households. Efforts at 
systemic reform were very slow in coming. Proposals prior to the meltdown 
of the capital markets in the fall of 2008 appeared to be both ambitious and 
without any serious prospect of realization. It would be two years before 
serious legislative efforts would finally materialize. In March 2008 the Pres-
ident's Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG), chaired by the Treas-
ury Secretary, offered a broader and more detailed set of proposals. 55 In its 
report the PWG identified short-term recommendations, designed to be im-
plemented immediately;56 intermediate-term recommendations, designed to 
be implemented in the intermediate term to increase the efficiency of finan-
cial regulation;57 and a long-term "Optimal Regulatory Structure," intended 
to reform and strengthen the regulation of U.S. financial institutions. 58 The 
Treasury recommendations were ambitious and complex, but they ultimate-
ly fed into the recommended long-term "optimal regulatory structure." This 
structure was itself a model of simplicity, based on fundamental principles 
51. 12 C.F.R. § 32.8 (2011). 
52. !d. 
53. /d. 
54. Lending Limits, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,922 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
55. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT 
FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008) [hereinafter TREASURY 
BLUEPRINT], available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf. 
56. !d. at 75-86. 
57. /d. at 89-133. 
58. /d.atl37-79. 
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of functional regulation.59 In contrast to the current thicket of institutional 
regulators that now supervise financial services in the United States, the 
recommended structure would include a relatively small core group of spe-
cialized regulators. 
Unfortunately, the Treasury Blueprint followed in a long tradition of 
broad studies of the structure of financial services regulation that have never 
come to fruition.60 Particularly for a study that emerged in the last months of 
a presidential term, the prospects for adoption of its recommendations 
seemed rather limited. What we were left with were the current responses to 
the subprime mortgage crisis as they then existed, responses that so far have 
done little to assuage the markets or bring significant relief to borrowers. 
The sad irony is that the Administration's March 13 pian-as well as 
the PWG Blueprint-relied on two basic elements that were simply no 
longer reliable. One was the notion of market discipline and voluntary re-
straint as a protection against disaster,61 features that had obviously not been 
very efficacious in the present crisis. The other was the assumption that 
state regulation of MFCs and the mortgage markets could be harnessed to 
59. On functional regulation, which establishes regulatory structures relating to 
functions and activities to be regulated rather than the nature of the particular institution 
being regulated, see TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR 
REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 39-40 
(1984) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM], available at 
http:/ /ia600402 .us.archive.org/11 /items/blueprintforrefoO 1 unitlblueprintforrefoO I unit. pdf. 
See generally 1 MALLOY, supra note 2, §§ 1.04[A]-[B] (discussing and contrasting institu-
tional and functional regulation). 
60. See, e.g., BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 59, at 44-52 (recommending fun-
damental changes to U.S. regulatory structure); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT TREASURY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS 61-63 (1991); see also I MALLOY, supra note 2, §§ 
1.04[A], [D] (discussing Task Group and Modernizing, respectively). The Treasury Blueprint 
itself notes, 
Over the past forty years, a number of Administrations have presented important 
recommendations for financial services regulatory reforms. Most previous studies 
have focused almost exclusively on the regulation of depository institutions as op-
posed to a broader scope of financial institutions. These studies served important 
functions, helping shape the legislative landscape in the wake of their release. 
TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 55, at 3 (footnote omitted). For background on the prior 
Administration studies referred to in the quotation, see id. at 197-206. 
61. The Treasury Blueprint itself looks favorably on market discipline as a comple-
ment to supervisory policy. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 55, at 137-38. At one point, it 
notes that the "PWG, the Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York, and the OCC have previously 
stated that market discipline is the most effective tool to limit systemic risk." I d. at 1 S n.2 
(citing AGREEMENT AMONG PWG AND U.S. AGENCY PRINCIPALS ON PRINCIPLES AND 
GUIDELINES REGARDING PRIVATE POOLS OF CAPITAL (2007); PWG, HEDGE FUNDS, 
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 24-25, 30 (1999); 
PWG, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 
34-35 (1999)). 
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"tighten their oversight of financial markets."62 In the wake of the sweeping 
preemption of state consumer-protection-based supervision of mortgage 
bankers resulting from long-standing preemption initiatives of the OCC63 
and the decision of the Supreme Court in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 64 
broadly confirming the Comptroller's policy, it would be foolish to expect 
state-based supervision of MFCs and mortgage banking to be effective in 
the current legal environment. This is the second linkage between the crisis 
and the small business sector. With the aggressive preemption of state con-
sumer protection law as applied to financial services, small business lost the 
free rider benefits of the externalities of consumer protection. We may agree 
with the PWG Blueprint that vigorous change is needed, but the roots of the 
subprime mortgage crisis are to be found in the aggressively preemptive, 
market-oriented policies of the Bush Administration. 
The effects of the subprime mortgage market meltdown in 2008 con-
tinued to deepen and spread in 2009. As of year-end 2009, 140 banks had 
been placed under Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation receivership, at a 
likely cumulative cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) of more than 
$1.8 billion.65 In the first quarter of2010 (Q1 2010), the FDIC was appoint-
ed receiver for forty-one failed banks and savings associations with a total 
exposure for the DIF of more than $320 million.66 By contrast, five credit 
unions failed during approximately the same period.67 By Q1 2011, "more 
than 3.5 million home mortgages were 90 or more days delinquent or in 
foreclosure ... , and estimates indicate that more than one in five mortgage 
62. Labaton, supra note 48, at A I. 
63. See, e.g., Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(3), (b)) (adopting regulations asserting broad preemptive 
authority). For an analysis by the OCC of preemption principles post-Dodd-Frank Act, see 
76 Fed. Reg. 43,549,43,554-558 (2011). 
64. 550 U.S. I, 7 (2007). But cf Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 
2717 (2009) (distinguishing Watters). For an exhaustive analysis of the role of state regula-
tion and enforcement in effective consumer protection, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The 
Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 
36 J. CORP. L. 893 (2011) (arguing that, particularly as compared with failure of federal 
consumer protection in relation to sub-prime mortgage market, Dodd-Frank Act Title X 
enables states to construct additional safety measures and to identil)' and counteract emerg-
ing threats to consumers of financial services). 
65. Thecla Fabian, Failed Federally Insured Banks Now 140; Insurance Fund Falls 
by $1.8 Billion Dec. 18, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 22, 2009, at D9. 
66. Thecla Fabian, Banks Fail in Georgia, Florida, Arizona; 2010 Now at 41 and 
D/F Loses $320 Million, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar. 30, 2010, at Dll. 
67. Thecla Fabian, Small Connecticut Credit Union Fifth 2010 Failure; State Regu-
lator Sees Many Problems, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 9, 2010, at Dl7. 
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borrowers owe[ d] more on their mortgages than their homes [were] 
worth."68 
B. Transnational Aspects 
The crisis quickly spread transnationally as well. By Q2 2009, lending 
by internationally active banks had declined by 1.1 percent (to $30.37 tril-
lion), according to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).69 In its lat-
est manifestation, the crisis has significantly affected the economies of 
many states that are members of the European Union, and in particular the 
economy of states that participate in the common currency of the Euro 
Zone. Member states like Greece and Ireland, and to a lesser extent Portu-
gal, have been driven by financial distress into political crisis as well.7° The 
situation remains decidedly in a state of flux. As the United States struggled 
to formulate an appropriate response to the crisis, 71 other states-and partic-
ularly EU member states-faced the necessity of dealing with the spill-over 
effects of the U.S. crisis in their own economies. At the EU level, in the 
early stages of the crisis there was an effort towards increased union-wide 
supervision in financial services markets, while at the member-state level, 
68. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-l f-656, MORTGAGE REFORM: 
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PROVISIONS IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT ON HOMEBUYERS AND THE 
MORTGAGE MARKET I (20 II). 
69. Daniel Pruzin, BIS Cites Continued Decline in Large Global Banks' Lending, 
BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 23, 2009, at D6. The data reflect reporting by banks in 
forty-two countries, including most of the world's major financial centers, but not China, 
Russia, or Saudi Arabia. /d. A survey of the twenty-one largest banks receiving financial 
assistance from the Treasury indicated that loan balances were trending downward beginning 
in March 2009, and declining in June 2009 by one percent. Mike Ferullo, Loans Balances 
Among TARP Recipients Declined in June, Treasury Reports, BNA BANKING DAILY, Aug. 
18, 2009, at D9. However, there was a thirteen percent increase in new loan originations. !d. 
Likewise, the percentage of "nontraditional," subprime or Alt-A loans and securities used as 
collateral to support FHLBank advances to member savings associations and banks had 
declined during 2008, accounting for approximately twenty percent of collateral securing 
advances as of December 31, 2008. Federal Home Loan Bank Collateral for Advances and 
Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,618 (Aug. 4, 
2009). 
70. See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr. & Christine Hauser, S.&P. Ranks Greece's Debt 
World's Lowest, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, at Bl (discussing Greek collapse); Joe Kirwin, 
EC OKs New Bailout for Failed Irish Bank As Talks Over Restructuring Plan Continue, 
BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Aug. II, 2010, at D3 (discussing Irish crisis); Bengt Ljung, 
EC, IMF, ECB Say Portugal Rescue Package Offers Balanced, Demanding, Realistic Path, 
BNA lNT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, May 6, 2011, at D9 (outlining Portuguese rescue). 
71. On the initial U.S. responses to the crisis, see Robert R. Bliss & George G. 
Kaufman, Resolving Insolvent Large Complex Financial Institutions: A Better Way, 128 
BANKING L.J. 339 (2011); John L. Ropiequet, Christopher S. Naveja & Jason B. Hirsh, An 
Introduction to the Dodd-Frank Act-The New Regulatory Structure for Consumer Finance 
Emerges, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP., Aug. 2010, at I. 
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the individual member states were repudiating legislative proposals to estab.., 
lish enhanced regional supervision in the insurance sector of the financial 
services markef2 and the banking sector.73 The result was a "shared ap-
proach" in which the twenty-seven EU member states agreed in mid-
December 2008 to a $256 billion economic stimulus response that set pa-
rameters for individual member states to increase domestic spending and 
reduce taxes, with EU-wide measures covering matters other than financial 
services regulation.74 Hence, direct EU policy concern was limited to safe-
guarding against anti-competitive effects of member state rescue efforts and 
bailouts. Most, if not all, of the twenty-seven EU member states sought ap-
proval ofbank rescue plans from the European Commission, although some 
of these requests for approval may only be pursued as a precaution.75 
The crisis continued to mutate towards a systemic crisis. In response, 
in May 2009 the European Commission outlined a plan calling for a new 
European Systemic Risks Council (ESRC) and new agencies to replace the 
committees that dealt with prudential issues of cross-border banking, insur-
ance, and financial services.76 To avoid a repetition of the crisis, the Com-
mission plan contemplated that the ESRC would keep a continuous watch 
on macroeconomic conditions in the EU and would issue warnings when 
problems such as undercapitalized banks or real estate bubbles appeared to 
threaten economic fundamentals. 77 
Also in May 2009, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly in 
favor of amendments to the EU Capital Requirements Directive to establish 
a new "college of supervisors" to oversee approximately forty-four banks 
with cross-border operations, strengthen banking supervision, and prevent 
future financial meltdowns.78 The Directive mandated a "five-percent" re-
tention rule requiring a banking institution selling securitized products to 
72. Joe Kirwin, EU Finance Ministers Reject Enhanced Supervision in Insurance, 
Banking Sectors, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 3, 2008, at D8 (reporting that EU 
member state agreement to new insurance regulatory regime conditioned on omission of EU-
wide insurance supervision). 
73. Joe Kirwin, Despite G-20 Stance, EU Members Resist EU-Wide Supervision of 
Insurance, Banking, BNA BANKING DAILY, Nov. 24, 2008, at D19. But see Joe Kirwin, EU, 
US. Should Work to Forge Joint Economic Recovery Package, Barroso Says, BNA INT'L 
Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 10, 2008, at D6 (reporting that France and United Kingdom had 
embraced commission plan for EU-wide stimulus package, with Germany still dissenting). 
74. Joe Kirwin, EU Leaders Back $256 Billion Package of Economic Stimulus, 
BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 15, 2008, at D7. 
75. Sweden, Portugal Latest Nations to Receive EC Approval of Financial Rescue 
Plans, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 31, 2008, available at http://bna.com. 
76. Joe Kirwin, EC to Outline Plan for New Council to Monitor Banking, Financial 
Services, BNA BANKING DAILY, May 26, 2009, at D25. 
77. /d. 
78. Joe Kirwin, EU Parliament OKs Plan to Tighten Supervision of Cross-Border 
Banking, BNA BANKING DAILY, May 7, 2009, at D28. 
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retain ownership over a portion of the offering.79 It also limited any large 
exposure of a banking institution to a single client or group of clients (in-
cluding interbank lending) to twenty-five percent of"own funds."80 
In December 2009, a galvanizing event occurred, as the Austrian Gov-
ernment was forced to nationalize Hypo Alpe-Adria, one of the leading 
Austrian banks, to prevent the bank's collapse as result of bad loans to East-
em European companies and the debt-ridden balance sheet of its parent, the 
German regional bank, BayernLB.81 "[T]he Austrian government took over 
the shares for a token amount."82 The Munich-based BayemLB, "the second 
largest state-owned bank," was required "to write off more than $3 billion in 
losses" resulting from its purchase of Hypo Alpe-Adria.83 "The Austrian 
Government also agreed to [inject] approximately $1 billion" into Hypo.84 
The crisis was worsening, and its spill-over effects were making its system-
ic dimension clearer. 
In December 2009, EU finance ministers approved a new EU-wide 
banking and financial services supervisory structure designed to prevent 
future financial crises, with a sovereignty concession demanded by the 
UK.85 The structure included a "macro-prudential" European Systemic Risk 
Board and a "micro-prudential" cluster of three new agencies supervising 
cross-border activities in banking, insurance, and pensions.86 These sectoral 
agencies would not have the authority to require a member state to rescue a 
particular financial institution with its headquarters in the member state.87 
However, it was unclear whether the European Parliament, where there was 
79. Id. 
80. Id. The twenty-five percent limit may be exceeded only for exposures between 
credit institutions and then only up to €150 million (approximately $200 million). Id. For 
these purposes, the term own funds refers to "[a] bank's available capital and reserves for the 
purposes of capital adequacy rules." "Own Funds" Definition, Financial Markets Glossary, 
MARKETS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, http://www.markets-international.com/glossary/ 
glossary4.htrnl#o. 
81. Joe Kirwin, European Banking Crisis Erupts Again; Austria Forced to National-
ize Leading Bank, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 15,2009, D12. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. The European Commission gave temporary approval to the rescue plan be-
cause of the systemic role that Hypo Alpe-Adria plays both in Austria and in other southeast-
ern European countries. EC Gives Temporary OK to Nationalized Bank in Austria, but Asks 
New Restructuring Plans, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 24, 2009, at D8 (reporting on rescue). 
The Commission also indicated that it was extending its in-depth investigation of state aid 
not only to cover the rescue, but also BayernLB, which had already received almost $40 
billion in bailout funds through capital injections and risk guarantees from the German Gov-
ernment. Id. 
85. Joe Kirwin, EU Finance Ministers Reach Compromise on Bank Supervision, but 
Parliament Objects, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 3, 2009, at D23. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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considerable sentiment for a single EU banking and fmance supervisory 
authority with broad powers, would approve the structure as compromised.88 
In April 2010, faced by unsustainable servicing costs for $400 billion 
in public debt, the Greek Government became the first Euro Zone member 
to request comprehensive assistance-as opposed to specific approval of an 
individual bank rescue measure-from the Commission, the European Cen-
tral Bank, and the International Monetary Fund to provide a loan arrange-
ment worth approximately $58 billion.89 The announcement of the EU-IMF 
plan helped to lower Greek sovereign debt interest rates over the short term, 
but doubts about it emerged as some Euro Zone countries, led by Germany, 
insisted that parliamentary approval would be required before bilateral loans 
included in the plan would be authorized if Greece should request them.90 
At this point, one might argue that the financial crisis was beginning 
to transform itself from a banking crisis into a challenge to the integrity of 
the Euro itself. The implications of such a challenge were denied by EU 
authorities. On May 10, 2011, for example, Economics Commissioner Olli 
Rehn said, '"We don't have a crisis of the [E]uro. We have a sovereign debt 
crisis in some [E]uro member states. "'91 A tenuous distinction, some might 
argue, particularly in light of the events that followed. Yet the threat to the 
integrity of the Euro does seem to be "collateral damage" stemming from 
national financial crises gone systemic. 
In August 2010, the European Commission approved an Irish Gov-
ernment bailout of approximately €9 billion ($13 billion) for Anglo Irish 
Bank, one oflreland's leading financial institutions, to '"preserve financial 
stability"' in the country.92 So far as can be ascertained at present, Anglo 
Irish Bank's difficulties were a result of the collapse of the commercial real 
estate market in Ireland, in which the bank was aggressively invested, but 
also a result in part of its portfolio investments in securitized assets funds 
tied to the U.S. subprime mortgage market.93 By November 2010, however, 
the banking crisis had so overwhelmed the Irish economy that the collapse 
of the banking system pushed the Irish Government into bankruptcy, requir-
88. /d. 
89. Joe Ktrwin & Andrea Schuessler, Greece Succumbs to Market Pressure, Re-
quests EU-IMF Public Finance Bailout, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Apr. 26, 20 I 0, at D8. 
90. /d. 
91. Bengt Ljung, EU Official: Portugal to Pay Interest Rate Above 5.5 Percent on 
Emergency Loans, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, May II, 2011, at D5 (quoting Commis-
sioner Rehn). 
92. Kirwin, supra note 70. Since that initial rescue effort, the Irish Government has 
required Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS) to merge, and the 
resulting entity will unwind over the next ten years. Joe Kirwin, EC Clears Plan to Wind 
Down Two Irish Banks, Creating Banking Duopoly, BNA lNT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, July I, 
2011, at D5. This leaves only the two largest Irish banks standing, Bank oflreland and Allied 
Irish Bank, and they are each waiting approval of their own rescue plan. /d. 
93. Kirwin, supra note 70. 
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ing it to obtain a $113 billion bailout from the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the International Monetary Fund, which was approved 
in early December 2010.94 
In mid-May 2011, EU finance ministers formally agreed to a €78 bil-
lion ($111 billion) loan package for Portugal, requiring fiscal consolidation, 
privatization conditions, and "re-pro filing" of private investors.95 Sponsored 
by the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, and the 
European Central Bank, the three-year austerity plan requires Portugal to 
reduce its budget deficit to three percent of gross domestic product by 
2013.96 Within that time, Portugal is also required to open up more of its 
economy to competition, to privatize public entities, and to freeze public-
private infrastructure projects. 97 In the financial sector, banks would be re-
quired to reduce their debt levels and to increase capital levels, through cap-
ital injections from the state, with the core "tier-one" capital-assets ratio98 
required to increase to nine percent in 2011 and to ten percent in 2012.99 
At this juncture, however, Greece was clearly experiencing difficulty 
in implementing the terms of its expanded €1 00 billion (approximately $150 
billion) rescue package, and the EU was beginning to consider a re-profiling 
of Greek sovereign debt, in exchange for, inter alia, a sweeping privatiza-
tion of more than €45 billion ($70 billion) worth of government assets. 100 By 
mid-June, Standard and Poor's had down-graded Greek debt to CCC, mak-
ing Greek public debt the lowest-rated in the world. 101 Yet the leading Euro 
Zone members continued to resist any suggestion that the debt might need 
to be restructured to provide fiscal relief to Greece. 102 Until the Fall 2011, 
EU leaders continued to apply pressure on Greek policy makers to accept a 
new package of economic austerity measures, in order to prevent a sover-
94. Joe Kirwin, EU Agreement Reached to Recapitalize Irish Banks, Spell Out Aid 
Conditions, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 8, 2010, at D6. 
95. Ljung, supra note 70; Joe Kirwin, EU Considers 'Re-Profiling' Approach to 
Resolve Continuing Greek Debt Crisis, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, May 18, 2011, at 
DB. The term re-profiling, sometimes referred to as "rescheduling," involves the voluntary 
rescheduling of repayment due dates on sovereign bonds, by way of contractual modifica-
tion. Kirwin, EU Considers 'Re-Profiling' Approach to Resolve Continuing Greek Debt 
Crisis, supra. 
96. Ljung, supra note 70. 
97. Id. 
98. "Core" or "tier-one" capital consists of equity capital (fully paid ordinary com-
mon stock and non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock) and disclosed reserves of post-tax 
earnings. See, e.g., International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Stand-
ards (Basle Capital Accord), 5 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 47-105, at 51,125 (Nov. 6, 
1991) (defining "Tier 1 capital"). 
99. Ljung, supra note 70. 
I 00. Kirwin, supra note 95. 
I 01. Thomas & Hauser, supra note 70. 
102. Bengt Ljung, Greece's Creditworthiness Receives Downgrade as EU Discusses 
Options, BNAINT'LBUS. &FIN. DAILY, May 10,2011, at D5. 
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eign debt default. The arrangement was expected to involve a "Brady bond" 
type of arrangement, 103 under which European banks with the largest expo-
sures in Greek sovereign debt would agree to a write-down of as much as 
fifty to sixty percent of the bonds they hold as they were rolled over into 
new thirty-year bonds. 104 
A key change in the atmospherics of the negotiations among· Euro 
Zone finance ministers came on June 17, 2011, when the German Chancel-
lor dropped demands for a "quantifiable and creditable" loan concession on 
the part of private creditors as a condition of approval of any new bailout 
plan for Greece. 105 Instead, Chancellor Merkel expressed willingness to ac-
cept an approach under which private creditors would be required to agree 
to rollover bonds as they mature into new bonds at more concessionary 
rates. 106 Furthermore, on June 20, 2011, the Euro Zone finance ministers 
agreed that the new European Stability Mechanism (ESM), set to begin in 
2013,107 would not accord preferred creditor status on bailout funds relating 
to Greece, Ireland, or Portugal. 108 If this consensus holds, it would increase 
the likelihood that these countries would in the future be able to attract pri-
vate investors if and when they returned to the bond markets.109 At the same 
time, instead of releasing some $16 billion in bailout funding due in July in 
order to keep the Greek Government solvent, the Euro Zone finance minis-
ters delivered an ultimatum that required approval of a new package of job 
and pay cuts before the funding would be made available. 110 
Greece yielded on June 30, 2011, to EU demands that it approve dras-
tic new fiscal austerity measures, and German banks indicated that they 
103. So-called "Brady bonds" are an artifact of the 1980s sovereign debt crisis in 
Latin America, in which U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicolas Brady negotiated the roll-over of 
Latin American government bonds by institutional investors, into newly issued bonds with 
financing support and guarantees from public international financial institutions. For discus-
sion of the elements of the Brady plan, see MICHAEL P. MALLOY, INTERNATIONAL BANKING: 
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 263 (2d ed. 2005). 
104. Bengt Ljung, EU Chiefs Settle Bank Recap Issue, Pursue Greek Debt Fix, Boost 
for EU Bailout Fund, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 27, 2011, available at 
http://www.bna.com. 
105. Joe Kirwin, Euro Zone Spies Daylight on Greek Deadlock As Germans Soften 
Private Creditor Demands, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, June 20, 2011, at D7. 
106. !d. 
107. See Joe Kirwin, EU Leaders Resolve Euro Zone Doubts with New Pact, Includ-
ing Bailout Mechanism, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Mar. 28, 2011, at 04 (discussing 
ESM). 
108. Joe Kirwin, Euro Zone Makes Exception for Private Debt in $1 Trillion Bailout 
Facility to Begin 2013, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, June 21,2011, at D6. 
109. !d. 
II 0. Joe Kirwin, Euro Zone Gambles on Greek Government Backing Austerity Pack-
age of Pay, Job Cuts, BNA lNT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, June 21,2011, at 07. 
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were ready to back a Greek debt rollover plan. 111 Euro Zone finance minis-
ters are now expected to approve the next installment of rescue lending of 
approximately $16 billion to maintain Greek solvency for the next few 
months. 112 
The current crisis highlighted the limits and shortcomings of the su-
pervisory structure of the EU. 113 The risk concentrations were not detected. 
Surveillance and supervision were not effective or timely. 114 Much of this 
was due to the difficulty of coordinating between national financial supervi-
sors within the EU member states. 115 Coordination was especially difficult at 
the height of the crisis in fall 2008, as large transborder banks confronted 
challenges. 116 
Clearly, there is a need for effective supervisory authority at the EU 
level. Member states bailed out banks over the past two years in a wide va-
riety of approaches, with little or no guidance or involvement at the EU 
level. In April 2010, Internal Markets Commissioner Michel Barnier called 
for the establishment of a "'coordinated resolution framework"' that would 
give the EU authorities a "tool box" of supervisory powers to prevent or 
intervene in bank crises in the future. 117 The tool box is expected to include 
more harmonized, preventive powers with respect to corporate governance 
standards, risk management requirements, and early intervention powers 
that would allow authorities to prohibit unsafe activities or to limit divi-
dends.118 
As of January 1, 2011, however, the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB)-a macro-supervisor for the financial industry-and three sectoral 
supervisory authorities assumed responsibility for EU-wide supervision of 
the stability of the financial system as a whole, not individual banks and 
other financial firms. 119 The ESRB, headquartered in the European Central 
Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt, will be responsible for "early warnings when sys-
temic risks are building up."120 It is chaired by the ECB president and in-
cludes the "heads of EU central banks [as well as] national and European 
Ill. Joe Kirwin, Euro Zone Ministers Expected to Back Greek Aid, Consider New 
Bank Rollover Plan, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, July I, 2011, at D4. 
112. !d. 
113. Bengt Ljung, Barnier Hails New EU Authorities to Supervise Banks, Markets, 
Pensions, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Jan. 4, 2011, available at http://www.bna.com 
(discussing supervisory conditions during crisis). 
114. !d. 
115. !d. 
116. !d. 
117. Joe Kirwin, EC Outlines 'Tool Box' Plans for Crisis Prevention, Management, 
BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, April20, 2010, available at http://www.bna.com. 
118. !d. 
119. Ljung, supra note 113. 
120. !d. 
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financial supervisors."121 The three sectoral supervisors are the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) based in London, the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) based in Paris, and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOP A) based in Frankfurt.122 While 
these new regulatory entities are intended to have broad supervisory au-
thority, the ongoing financial crisis and its ad hoc treatment by EU and in-
ternational institutions has distracted attention from these new structures. It 
remains to be seen whether they will in fact be able to provide efficiently 
and effectively the kind of early-warning, swift-response approach to sys-
temic financial crisis that was so lacking in the current crisis. 
Something more was required at the micro-level, however. In June 
2010, the European Commission suggested in a green paper that stricter 
corporate governance and enhanced shareholder rights for financial service 
companies would be required to support the effectiveness of any new regu-
lations that the EU might adopt to prevent future fmancial crises.123 A year 
later, we are still searching for such rules. 
A European meltdown was only averted in 2010 by establishing an 
emergency $1 trillion joint bailout fund together with the International 
Monetary Fund.124 At this stage, the current debate needs to shift its focus 
from the public solvency issues that have dominated public attention so far, 
and concentrate on improving safety and soundness supervision throughout 
the EU. One element of this new approach would be to establish a perma-
nent emergency contingency fund, like the U.S. Treasury's Exchange Stabi-
lization Fund (ESF), 125 designed to act as a fall-back in the face of any fu-
ture Euro Zone country sovereign debt problems. The European Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism (EFSF), initiated in May 2010 in response to the 
risk of a Euro'meltdown, will expire-in 2013. 126 The ESM, set to begin in 
2013 with funding planned to be in excess of €675 billion (neatly $1 tril-
121. !d. 
122. !d. 
123. Commission Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions 
and Remuneration Policies, COM(2010) 284 final (June 2, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ market/company/docs/modern/com20 I 0 _ 284 _ en.pdf. 
124. Joe Kirwin, Andrea Schuessler & Diana I. Gregg, EU Ministers, ECB, IMF 
Marshal Forces To Stabilize Euro With Trillion Dollar Plan, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, 
May 11, 2010, available at http://www.bna.com (discussing 2010 bailout measures). 
125. 31 U.S.C. § 5302 (2006) (authorizing use ofESF for exchange transactions and 
other investment activities); see also 22 U.S.C. § 262r-3 (2006) (providing for reports on use 
of ESF in IMF stabilization programs); see generally id. §§ 286e-3, 286o-286p (2006) (au-
thorizing use ofESF in connection with IMF transactions). 
126. Joe Kirwin, European Commission Proposes Bank Tax as Way to Finance Euro 
Zone Bailout Fund, BNA lNT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Jan 18, 2011, available at 
http://www.bna.com. 
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lion), 127 would have the authority to buy primary market bonds of a Euro 
Zone country requiring its assistance, so long as the country commits to an 
austerity budget package. 
However, funding the ESM may be problematic. In January 2011, the 
European Commission suggested that Euro Zone members impose a one-
time 0.2 percent tax on Euro Zone bank assets, which should yield revenues 
of €45 billion (approximately $66 billion) to help finance the ESM. 128 This 
provoked intense criticism from European banking interests, and resistance 
from member states participating in negotiations to create the ESM. 129 As a 
result, final approval of the overall design of the ESM was not achieved 
until March 2011. 130 
This reluctance may suggest that, outside of traditional EU concerns 
and authority, EU policymakers still confront to some extent a system that 
thinks in national perspectives with only ad hoc consideration of regional 
supervisory concerns. As a result, a major crisis in the financial services 
market is almost inevitably viewed at first as an individual member state 
concern, with the attention of EU official typically limited to the effects of 
the rescue on European competition and subsidy policy. 131 With the capital 
markets still very much in play, this policy horizon must widen or the bene-
fits of European single market policy may contract. 
II. U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
A. Dodd-Frank and the Crisis 
While early attempts by the U.S. Government to respond to the crisis 
may have seemed half-hearted, the deepening crisis demanded action, and 
eventually the demand led to the enactment on July 21, 2010, of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA),132 the most 
significant structural response so far to the ongoing financial crisis precipi-
tated by the failure of the subprime mortgage market. In many respects the 
127. Joe Kirwin, EU Leaders Resolve Euro Zone Doubts with New Pact, Including 
Bailout Mechanism, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Mar. 28, 2011, available at 
http://www.bna.com. 
128. Kirwin, supra note 126. 
129. Joe Kirwin, Finance Ministers Make Little Progress Toward Revising Euro 
Zone Bailout Fund, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Jan. 19, 2011, available at 
http://www.bna.com. 
130. Kirwin, supra note 127. 
131. See, e.g., EU Governments' Subsidies Nearly Triple in 2008 as Result of Eco-
nomic Crisis, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 8, 2009, available at http://www.bna.com 
(discussing EU policy interests in competition and subsidy effects). 
132. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)(codified at scattered sections of2, 5, 7, II, 12, 15, 18, 20, 22, 26, 
28, 31, 42,44 U.S.C.) [hereinafter DFA]. 
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new act, sprawling over hundreds of printed pages, is dense and impondera-
ble, 133 but its basic theme is to mandate new supervision and controls over 
large and "systemically significant" financial institutions on the one hand, 
and to create genuine consumer protection mechanisms at the federal level 
on the other hand. Since administrative implementation of the DF A will 
likely stretch out over several years, it remains to be seen whether these two 
basic but diametrical goals can be maintained in balance with each other, 
and whether the Act is adequate to the task of effectively reforming the reg-
ulatory structure applicable to the financial services industry. The principal 
features of the Act are described below. 
First, in a dramatic development, the DF A transferred the functions 
and responsibilities of the Office of Thrift Supervision to the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC, 134 except for authority over sav-
ings and loan holding companies and affiliate transactions, which was trans-
ferred to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board (Federal 
Reserve ). 135 The transfer was effective July 21, 2011, 136 and the OTS and its 
director were to be abolished ninety days after that effective date. 137 
Second, the Act established a Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC), a committee of financial services regulators. 138 The FSOC is in-
tended "to identify systemic risks, to promote market discipline, and to re-
spond to emerging threats to the U.S. financial system."139 For those non-
bank financial companies identified by the FSOC as systemically signifi-
cant,140 the Act has expanded and enhanced the authority of the Federal Re-
serve to supervise nonbank financial companies. 141 This authority is in addi-
tion to its traditional authority over bank holding companies. 142 DF A also 
created FDIC authority to supervise resolution of financial crises-or "or-
133. For tabular analysis of the DFA, see I MALLOY, supra note 2, figs. 1.37 & 1.38. 
For tabular analysis of regulatory implementation of the DFA, see id. fig. 1.39. 
134. See DFA §§ 312(b)(2)(B), 314 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4a, 11, 
5412(b)(2)(B)) (OCC authority). Residual authority over state savings associations was 
transferred to the FDIC.Jd. § 312(b)(2)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412(b)(2)(C)). 
135. !d.§ 312(b)(l), (b)(2)(A) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5412(b)(l), (2)(A)). 
136. !d. § 311(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5411(a)). The effective date may be extend-
ed under certain specified circumstances. !d. § 311(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §5411(b)). 
Technical details of the transfer are handled by DFA §§ 302, 312(a)-(b ), 317, 319, 322-327. 
137. !d.§ 313 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5413). 
138. !d. § 111(a)-(h) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321(a)-(h)). For discussion of the 
functions of the FSOC, see 1 MALLOY, supra note 2, § 1.03[H]. 
139. DFA § 112(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(l)). 
140. !d. § 113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3523). 
141. !d.§§ 161-169 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5369); see also id. § 170 (codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. § 5370) (providing for safe harbor exemptions for certain types or classes 
of U.S. nonbank financial companies or foreign nonbank financial companies from supervi-
sion by Fed). 
142. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1852 (2011) (authorizing regulatory role of Federal 
Reserve over bank and financial holding companies). 
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derly liquidation"-with respect to any systemically significant financial 
company. 143 This is distinct from FDIC authority over insured depository 
institutions. 144 
Third, DF A established a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
within the Federal Reserve to create and enforce effective consumer protec-
tion principles with respect to financial services. 145 Title X of the DF A also 
appears to repudiate the broad preemptive effect of Watters and its proge-
ny.146 Nevertheless, despite-Title X, DFA does not represent a clean break 
with past preemption practices of the OCC and the OTS. 147 In certain re-
spects, it substantially preserves federal preemption of state regulation of 
financial services, but with important exceptions in the consumer protection 
area. 148 
Fourth, DF A restricts, but does not eliminate, proprietary securities 
trading by banks. 149 For these purposes, proprietary trqding is defined to 
mean 
engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking entity or nonbank fi-
nancial company supervised by the [Federal Reserve] in any transaction to pur-
chase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, any security, any derivative, any 
contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any option on any such securi-
ty, derivative, or contract, or any other security or financial instrument that the ap-
propriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule as provided in [§ 
1851(b)(2)], determine. 150 
143. DFA §§ 201-214 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4403, 5381-5394; 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1032(1)). 
144. !d.§ 201(a)(8)(B) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(8)(B)). 
145. !d. §§ 1001-1067 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§25b, 1465, 5481, 5491-5497, 5511-
5519, 5531-5536, 5551-5587; 20 U.S.C. §9702(c)(l), (d)). For an excellent survey of the 
history and current state of consumer protection law and policy in the United States, see 
Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the Institutionalization of 
Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1147 (2010) (arguing 
that consumer protection principles are embedded in U.S. law and policy, both in terms of 
individual litigation and likely state and federal legislative policy). 
146. See, e.g., DFA § 1044 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)) (establishing narrow 
grounds for federal preemption of state consumer protection laws). 
147. See I MALLOY, supra note 2, § 1.03[I][2] (discussing effect of federal preemp-
tion policy on state bank regulation). 
148. See R. Christian Bruce, Dodd-Frank Act's Language on Preemption Forces 
Some Quick Decisions, Lawyers Say, BNA BANKING DAILY, July 23, 2010, at D12 (discuss-
ing implications for preemption). 
149. DFA § 619 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851). 
150. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4) (2011). 
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In addition, DF A § 619 requires the FSOC to study and make recommenda-
tions on implementing this restriction on proprietary trading, known as the 
"Volcker Rule." 151 
Fifth, DF A imposes new mortgage lending standards. 152 These would 
include rules implementing appraisal independence standards mandated by 
DFA § 1472(a), which enacted the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) § 129E. 
TILA § 129E establishes new requirements for appraisal independence in 
consumer credit transactions secured by the consumer's principal dwell-
ing.153 This would ensure that real estate appraisals used to support credi-
tors' underwriting decisions are based on an appraiser's independent profes-
sional judgment, free of influence or pressure that might be exerted by par-
ties with an interest in the transaction .. 
Sixth, for all market participants, DF A imposes new standards with re-
spect to securitization of pools of financial instruments. 154 Prior to the 2008 
collapse of the mortgage market, securitization, the process in which inter-
ests in a pool of obligations or rights were marketed to investors as pro rata 
securities, was one of the critical processes for moving mortgage obligations 
into the capital markets as securities. This provision has the potential to 
eliminate the danger of rampant securitization that was characteristic of the 
subprime mortgage market at its height, but it remains to be seen whether it 
will create a safer regulatory environment for the capital markets. 
151. DFA § 619(b). The restriction is called the "Volcker Rule" for former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, who first recommended the inclusion of a broader prohibi-
tion in the draft that eventually became the DFA. See Stephen Joyce, SEC Official: Dodd-
Frank, Volcker Rule Protect Investors, Help Financial Markets, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar. 
9, 2011, at D20 (discussing Volcker Rule and current controversy concerning its regulatory 
implementation). 
152. DFA §§ 1401-1484 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701p-2, 1701x(a)(4), 
(c)(5)(A)(ii)(III)-(V), (e), (g)-(i), 1701x-l, 2603(c), 2604(a)-(d), 2605(e)-(t), (g), (k)-(m), 
3310, 3332(a)(1), (5)-(6), (b), 3335, 3338(a)-(b), 3339, 3341(b), 3342, 3345(c), (e), 3346, 
3347(a), (b)(2), 3348(a)(2), 3350(6), (8), (11), 3351(a)(1), (b), (d), (g)-(i), 3353-3355, 5219a-
5219b, 5220b; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1604(h), 1607(a)(7), 1638(a)(16)-(19), (b)(4), (t), 1638a, 
1639(e), (j)-(v), 1639a-1639h, 1640(a), (e), (k)-(1), 1691(e); 42 U.S.C. § 3533(g), 8108; 
repealing 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)(2)); see Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,554 (Oct. 28, 2010) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I; removing 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(b)) (promulgating inter-
im rule implementing DFA § 1472). 
153. DFA § 1472 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639(e)). 
154. /d.§§ 941-945 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(5), 77g(c)-(d), 78c(a)(4)(B)(vii)(l), 
78c(a)(77), 78o(d), 78o-11); see also id. § 621(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2a) (concern-
ing conflicts of interest with respect to securitizations ); cf id. § 619(g)(2) (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 1851 (g)(2)) (protecting otherwise authorized sale or securitization of loans by bank-
ing entity or systemically significant nonbank financial company from prohibitions on pro-
prietary trading). 
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Seventh, DF A enhances the enforcement powers of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). 155 It also allows for the SEC to maintain an 
additional $100 million of its revenues in a separate fund, which the SEC 
could use as necessary, with a full accounting to Congress.' 56 Unfortunately, 
implementation of these new powers has been stalled by skepticism on the 
part of the new Congress. 
Eighth, DF A requires hedge fund and private equity fund advisers to 
register with the SEC and will subject them to SEC inspection and examina-
tion. 157 A hedge fund can be defined as an investment fund open to a limited 
number of investors and requiring a relatively large initial minimum in-
vestment, committed to the fund for a relatively long period of time. 158 Typ-
ically, its investment strategies are aggressive, with leveraged and derivative 
trading intended "to increase the rate of return when the securities perform 
well."159 A private equity fund can be understood as an investment fund spe-
cializing in investments not quoted on a public exchange. 160 Typically, it 
invests directly in existing private companies, or gains a controlling interest 
in a public company and takes it private. Investors in these funds are usually 
institutions or sophisticated, wealthy individuals who place relatively large 
amounts with the fund for a relatively long period of time. 161 
155. DFA §§ 912, 919, 921-929X (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§3101, 3114(a); 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77h-l(g), 77o, 77s(e), 77t(d)(3)(A), 77v(a), 78d-5, 78g(c)(I)(A), 78i(d)-(j), 78j(a)(I), 
78m, 78m(t), 78o(b)(6)(A), (c)(l)(A), (e)-(j), (n)-(o), 78o-4(c)(4), (8), 78o-5(c), 78p(a), 
78q(t)(l)-(2), 78q-l(c)(4)(C), (g), 78s(h)(4), 78t(a), (e), 78u(a)(l), (d)(3)(C)(i), 78u-l, 78u-
2(a), 78u-6, 78u-7, 78x, 78aa, 78cc(a), 78ddd(d)(l)(C), (h), 78eee(a)(3), 78fff-3(a)(l), (d)-
(e), 78jjj(c)-(d), 80a-9(d)(l), 80a-30, 80a-35(a), 80a-4l(e)(3)(A), 80a-43, 80a-48, 80b-3(t), 
(i)(l), 80b-4, 80b-5(a), (f), 80b-9(e)(3)(A), (f), 80b-10(d), 80b-14, 7201(9), 7215(c)(6), 7216, 
7217(d)(3), 7246(a)-(b); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(a), (b)(2), (e)); DFA §§ 912, 919, 921-929X 
(codified at scattered sections of5, 15, 18 U.S.C.). 
156. !d. § 991 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f(b), 78d(i), 78m(e), 78n(g), 78ee(m), 
78kk) (match funding). 
157. !d.§§ 401-412,419 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a)(I 1), (29)-(30), 80b-3(b), 
(1)-(n), 80b-3a(a), 80b-4, 80b-IO(c), 80b-ll, 80b-18b). As a general rule, these registration 
requirements are effective as of July 21, 2011, except that an investment adviser may, in its 
discretion, register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 during this one-
year transition period, subject to rules to be promulgated by the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2 
(2011). 
158. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 271 (3d ed. 2011). 
159. !d. at 272. 
160. !d. 
161. The DFA treats these definitional issues less helpfully. See DFA § 619 (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 1851), which defines both terms as follows: 
The terms 'hedge fund' and 'private equity fund' mean an issuer that would be an 
investment company, as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 
U.S.C. § 80a-l et seq.), but for [the Investment Company Act exemptive provi-
sions in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(l) or (c)(7)], or such similar funds as the appropriate 
Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the 
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Ninth, DF A provides for comprehensive regulation of swaps and secu-
rity-based swaps by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
and the SEC162 in consultation with the Federal Reserve. 163 The SEC and the 
CFTC have joint responsibility for swap products, to be allocated between 
the two agencies depending on whether the underlying product is a "securi-
ty" or not. 164 Institutions deemed to be swap dealers-typically, large banks 
that act as market makers in swaps by creating and selling them165-as well 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule, as provided in subsection 
(b )(2), determine. 
The exempting provisions referred to in the quoted excerpt actually provide a more informa-
tive description of these types of funds as follows: 
[N]one of the following persons is an investment company within the meaning of 
[the Investment Company Act]: 
(I) Any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are bene-
ficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and 
does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities .... 
(7)(A) Any issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by 
persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers 
[i.e., sophisticated investors], and which is not making and does not at that time 
propose to make a public offering of such securities .... 
(E) For purposes of determining compliance with this paragraph and paragraph (I), 
an issuer that is otherwise excepted under this paragraph and an issuer that is oth-
erwise excepted under paragraph (I) shall not be treated by the Commission as be-
ing a single issuer for purposes of determining whether the outstanding securities 
of the issuer excepted under paragraph (I) are beneficially owned by not more than 
I 00 persons or whether the outstanding securities of the issuer excepted under this 
paragraph are owned by persons that are not qualified purchasers .... 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(l), (c)(7) (2011); see Clemente Global Growth Fund, Inc. v. Pickens, 
705 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (interpreting§ 80a-3(c)(l)). 
162. DFA §§ 711-716, 718 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d(h), 24(c); 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78o(c)(3)(C), 8301-8306). 
163. /d. § 712(a)(8) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(8)). 
164. !d. § 717 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(l)(C), 7a-2(c)(l); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c-1, 
78s(b)(10)); cf id. § 720 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8308) (memorandum of understanding to 
be negotiated between CFTC and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). The SEC and the 
CFTC have already jointly issued proposed rules "further defining" key terms and regulating 
"mixed swaps." Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 51,429 (proposed Aug. 20, 20 10) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pt. 1 (CFTC rules); pt. 240 (SEC rules)). Public comments were due September 20, 
2010./d. 
165. At the same time, a "de minimis" exception from designation as a swap dealer is 
available to "an entity that engages in a de minimis quantity of swap dealing in connection 
with transactions with or on behalf of its customers." DFA § 721(a)(49)(D) (codified at 7 
U.S.C. § la(a)(49)(D)). This clause is important for regional banks and other smaller finan-
cial institutions such as savings associations and credit unions and will enable them to avoid 
the regulatory burdens likely to be associated with being identified as a swap dealer. 
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as "major swap participants" are required to register with either the SEC or 
CFTC, depending on the nature of their products. 166 
Despite the welcome imposition of disclosure requirements with re-
spect to, and federal supervision over, derivatives and derivatives markets, 
there are still no clearly established jurisdictional lines between the SEC and 
the CFTC over derivatives. For example, the DFA provides that the SEC 
and the CFTC, in consultation with the Federal Reserve, must jointly "fur-
ther define" certain key terms (specifically, "swap," "security-based swap," 
"swap dealer," "security-based swap dealer," "major swap participant," 
"major security-based swap participant," "eligible contract participant," and 
"security-based swap agreement"), and jointly prescribe regulations regard-
ing "mixed swaps," as that term is used in DF A Title VII. 167 Hence, at the 
statutory level there remains fundamental uncertainty about the scope of the 
new derivatives approach. 
Tenth, DF A imposes disclosure requirements on credit rating agen-
cies, and requires their registration with and supervision by the SEC. 168 DF A 
also expands the availability of private rights of action against credit rating 
agencies. It eliminates an explicit exclusion of private rights of action aris-
ing out of 1934 Act, 169 requiring registration of nationally recognized statis-
tical rating organizations. 170 It also includes credit rating agencies implicitly 
among the "persons liable" under the 1933 Act for having prepared or certi-
fied part of a registration statement by eliminating an SEC rule171 that 
deemed credit ratings not to be a part of the registration statement "prepared 
or certified" by a person within the meaning of the private right of action 
under 1933 Act § 11. 172 Hence, credit ratings are now part of the "expert-
ised" portions of a 1933 Act registration statement filed with the SEC, giv-
ing rise to an express private right of action against a credit rating agency 
for materially false or misleading ratings prepared by it and contained in 
such a statement. 173 
166. !d.§§ 721-724 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ Ia, lb, 2(a)(l), (c)(2)(A), (i)-(j), 6(c)(l), 
(6), 6d(t) 6m, 6q, 6s(l), 7-7a-l, 13-l(a), 16(h), 27; II U.S.C. § 761; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 8321-
8322). 
167. See id. §§ 711-716, 718 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d(h), 24(c); 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78o( c )(3)(C), 830 1-8306). 
168. See id. §§ 931-9398, 939F (codified 12 U.S.C. §§ 24a, 1817(b)(l)(E)(i), 183le, 
4519; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a(3)(a), 78c(a)(62), 78o-7(m), (u)-(v), 78o-8, 78u-4(b )(2), 80a-
6(a)(5)(A)(iv)(l); 22 U.S.C. § 286hh(a)(6)). 
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(2) (2006) (foreclosing implication of private right of 
action resulting from registration of statistical rating agency). 
170. DFA § 933(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)) (applying 1934 Act enforce-
ment and penalty provisions to statements made by a credit rating agency). 
171. 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g) (2009) (nullified by DFA § 9390). 
172. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). 
173. Pre-Dodd-Frank litigation attempts to impose liability on credit rating agencies 
that provided misleading favorable ratings for securitized subprime mortgage pools have 
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Eleventh, DFA requires companies registered pursuant to 1934 Act§ 
12174 to permit their shareholders to have a nonbinding vote, at least once 
every three years, 175 on executive compensation. 176 DF A also requires dis-
closure by any person soliciting proxies in favor of a merger or other acqui-
sition of any "golden parachute" compensation agreement or understanding 
in favor of departing executives in connection with the mt;:rger or acquisi-
tion.177 These provisions of DF A do not appear to supersede substantive 
guidance previously issued by the regulators. 178 
B. The Crisis Continues for Small Business 
Despite these and many other reform aspects of DF A, there are many 
missing features and potential shortcomings in the government response to 
the crisis. The absence of some of these features raises genuine concerns 
about the adequacy and likely effectiveness of DF A. The fmal shape of the 
Act reflects certain significant political compromises made by the Admin-
istration and/or the principal sponsors of the legislation, and it is not clear 
that the political atmosphere will improve in the near term. For example, the 
Act "does not address the operations of government-sponsored housing fi-
generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Merrill Lynch & 
Co., 714 F. Supp. 2d 475,481-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing 1933 Act§ II action against 
credit rating agencies; holding agencies not "underwriters" for § II purposes); Teamsters 
Allied Benefit Funds v. McGraw, 09 CIV.I40 (PGG), 2010 WL 882883, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. II, 20 I 0) (dismissing derivative suit by shareholders of parent company of credit rating 
agency for failure to state adequate claim under 1934 Act § I O(b )). 
174. 15 u.s.c. § 781. 
175. The DFA allows for more frequent nonbinding votes, upon the approval of the 
shareholders in that regard. See DFA § 951 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-l(a)(2)) (permitting, 
at least once every six years, shareholder vote on frequency of compensation votes). 
176. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-l(a)(l) (2011). 
177. !d. § 78n-l(b)(l). For these purposes, the term "golden parachute" is character-
ized by the statute as 
!d. 
any type of compensation (whether present, deferred, or contingent) that is based 
on or otherwise relates to the acquisition, merger, consolidation, sale, or other dis-
position of all or substantially all of the assets of the issuer and the aggregate total 
of all such compensation that may (and the conditions upon which it may) be paid 
or become payable to or on behalf of such executive officer. 
178. For example, in late June 2010, the OCC, the Fed, the FDIC, and the OTS 
adopted final guidance designed to ensure that "incentive compensation policies" at banking 
organizations did not encourage imprudent risk-taking, and that they were consistent with 
safety and soundness. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 
36,395, 36,405-36,414 (June 25, 20 I 0). The guidance was effective June 25, 2010. 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 36,396. 
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nance enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac."179 In some re-
spects, the insolvency of these two enterprises and the subsequent govern-
ment takeover of both in September 2008 are two of the strike points that 
helped to unleash the meltdown of the capital markets. 180 It may reasonably 
be argued that their long-term disposition should have been treated in the 
regulatory reform legislation. 181 As it is, the two enterprises have already 
"required about $150 billion in Treasury funds" to continue operation. 182 
Even a cursory review of the principal features ofDFA reveals that, no mat-
ter how effective these provisions may be on their own terms, they are di-
rected almost exclusively at macroeconomic, structural concerns, rather 
than the microeconomic, interstitial issues that are likely to have the most 
immediate impact on the small business sector. Many of the structural 
changes may well result in a stronger, more stable system of capital access, 
and this would eventually be of benefit to small business. However, the 
extended deadlines for implementation of many of these measures-and the 
growing political volatility surrounding financial services reform-make it 
likely that the small business sector is unlikely to see improvement in its 
economic conditions within a reasonable period of time. 
Reform features that might offer indirect benefits to the small business 
sector are mired in transitional mode. The mortgage market remains, three 
years after the collapse of the subprimes, still largely under water, and the 
concomitant retail activity that normally flourishes around a vibrant real 
estate market is holding its breath. Prospective reforms in mortgage lending 
standards, credit rating practices, and safety and soundness supervision are 
still awaiting implementation. 
DF A gave relatively little attention to direct efforts to improve condi-
tions for the small business sector. There are nine DF A provisions that ap-
pear to consider explicitly the need for amelioration of the impact of reform 
measures on the small business sector. None of these provisions is particu-
larly proactive or of appreciably broad effect. The administrative procedure 
for comment-gathering where a significant economic impact on a substan-
tial number of small entities is expected has been amended. Prior to publica-
tion of an initial regulatory flexibility analysis that the CFPB, among other 
"covered agencies,"183 is required to conduct, the Bureau must notify the 
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and pro-
179. See, e.g., Mike Ferullo et al., Senate Sends Financial Regulatory Reform to 
White House for President's Signature, BNA BANKING DAILY, July 16, 2010, at D12 (dis-
cussing situation of two enterprises). 
180. ld. 
181. Jd. 
182. Jd. 
183. On the meaning of the term "covered agency" for these purposes, see 5 U.S.C. § 
609(d) (2011). 
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vide "information on the potential impacts of the proposed rule on small 
entities and the type of small entities that might be affected."184 In the right 
hands, this notification could lead to significant input in the rulemaking 
deliberations of the CFPB, but it does not appreciably constrain the discre-
tion of the agency to impose regulatory burdens on the small business sec-
tor. 
By contrast, DF A does impose substantive limitations on the authority 
of the CFPB with respect to merchants, retailers, and other sellers of nonfi-
nancial goods or services that regularly extend credit subject to a finance 
charge. 185 A seller is not subject to this authority if, pursuant to § 3 of the 
Small Business Act/86 it "meets the relevant industry size threshold to be a 
small business concem."187 The breadth of this exception is narrowed by the 
additional conditions that the seller must extend credit only for the sale of 
nonfinancial goods or services, 188 and must retain the credit on its own ac-
counts.189 As a result, this exception from the scope of CFPB authority is 
unlikely to free up a small business determined to expand and diversify its 
services. 
Likewise, DF A provides an exemption from SEC registration for any 
investment adviser that acts solely as the adviser to a small business invest-
ment company (SBIC), 190 or to companies in the process of qualifying as 
SBICs. 191 Yet even here, the price of the exemption is an artificial limit to 
growth and diversification. 
The DF A offers no relief to small business owners under the new min-
imum standards for residential mortgage loans. To the contrary, the act em-
phasizes that, in considering a loan application a creditor is permitted to 
take into account "the seasonality and irregularity" of any small business 
income of the applicant "in the underwriting of and scheduling of payments 
for such credit."192 
On the other hand, DF A does mandate the request for and collection 
and reporting of loan application data with respect to the small business 
status of applicants. 193 The purpose of this mandate is to facilitate enforce-
ment of fair lending laws, and to "enable communities, governmental enti-
184. !d. §609(b)(I). 
185. 12 U.S.C. § 5517(a)(2)(B)(iii) (201 0) (granting authority to CFPB). 
186. 15 U.S.C. § 632. 
187. 12 U.S.C. § 5517(a)(2)(D)(ii)(III). 
188. /d. § 5517(a)(2)(D)(ii)(l). On the scope of the tenn credit for the sale of nonfi-
nancial goods, see id. § 5517(a)(2)(A)(i). 
189. !d. § 5517(a)(2)(D)(ii)(II). However, the credit may be sold or conveyed if the 
debt "is delinquent or otherwise in default." !d. 
190. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 661-689q. 
191. !d. § 80b-3(b)(7). 
192. !d.§ 1639c(a)(9). 
193. !d.§ 169Ic-2(b). 
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ties, and creditors to identify business and community development needs 
and opportunities of ... small businesses,"194 among others. The data, ana-
lyzed and aggregated in accordance with the provision, 195 conceivably 
would be a useful tool for identifying "redlining" of small business loan 
applications by a financial institution. As a general rule, no loan underwrit-
er, financial institution loan officer or employee, or affiliate is permitted 
access to this data. 196 This seems somewhat impractical, especially since the 
seasonality or irregularity of small business income can be considered by a 
creditor in deciding on the terms of mortgage loans. 197 Indeed, this provision 
itself recognizes that the financial institution might consider it important for 
the underwriter or others to have access to the information in making a de-
termination on the application. The institution may do so, provided that it 
gives notice to the loan applicant, "along with notice that the financial insti-
tution may not discriminate on the basis of such information."198 Obviously, 
this last notice might be somewhat misleading, since DF A itself allows the 
small business source of repayment income to be considered in determining 
whether income is seasonable or irregular. 
On the somewhat controversial issue of interchange debit transaction 
fees, 199 DF A could actually give small businesses some relief, although it 
remains doubtful whether it will. DF A expressly limits any interchange 
transaction fee that any debit card issuer may receive or charge on an elec-
tronic debit transaction to what is "reasonable and proportional to the cost 
incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction,"200 and authorizes the 
Federal Reserve to promulgate rules implementing the provision and pre-
venting circumvention or evasion. However, in promulgating these rules, 
the Federal Reserve was required to "consult, as appropriate, with ... the 
Administrator of the Small Business Administration,"201 among others. The 
provision gives no indication as to the parameters of this consultation, and 
the provision's explicit understanding of what constitutes a "small issuer" of 
debit cards-"any issuer that, together with its affiliates, has assets of less . 
than $10,000,000,000mo2-raises a question as to the congressional motiva-
194. !d.§ 169lc-2(a). 
195. See id. § 169lc-2(e)-(t) (concerning compilation and maintenance of data, sub-
mission to CFPB). 
196. !d.§ 169lc-2(d)(1). 
197. !d. § 1639c(a)(9); see supra text accompanying note 192. 
198. !d. § 1691 c-2( d)(2). 
199. See, e.g., TCF Nat'I Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(denying preliminary injunction in case challenging constitutionality of interchange debit 
transaction fee restrictions). 
200. 15 U.S. C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2011 ). 
201. !d. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(C). 
202. !d. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A). 
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tion in exempting small issuers. Apparently, "small" was never a more rela-
tive concept than it is now. 
Only in the area of community development policy do we get any 
straightforward expression of the need for affirmative support of small 
business growth and development,203 and then only as an annotation to a 
codified section of the Housing and Community Development Act.204 We 
are told that out of fresh funds allocated for community development, the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development should be guided by, among 
others, the principle that "[a ]n eligible entity receiving a grant ... shall, to 
the maximum extent feasible, provide for the hiring of employees who re-
side in the vicinity ... of projects funded under this section or contract with 
small businesses that are owned and operated by persons residing in the 
vicinity of such projects."205 That lawyerly phrase "to the maximum extent 
feasible"206 speaks volumes about the limits ofDFA's concern with the via-
bility of small businesses in the midst of the Great Recession. 207 
Small business lending by credit card banks is supposed to be encour-
aged by amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act, 208 but at most this 
may free up lending by credit card banks to small businesses from the as yet 
unquantified regulatory costs of BHCA regulation. One might question 
whether these assumed cost savings would adequately incentivize small 
business lending-assuming that it is actually a realistic incentive in light of 
the other restrictions on the exemption. 209 
203. See DFA, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1497, 124 Stat. 1376, 2209 (codified at 42 
u.s.c. § 5301). 
204. /d. 
205. /d. § 1497(a)(8) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5301) (emphasis added). 
206. /d. 
207. Thus, according to Webster's New World College Dictionary 519 (4th ed. 2000), 
"feasible" can be defined as "capable of being done or carried out; practicable; possible," but 
it carries a secondary-and more nuanced-meaning of"within reason; likely or probable." 
208. See DFA § 628 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F)(v)) (exempting from 
definition of bank, for purposes of BHCA, any institution making commercial loans only in 
the form of credit card loans "made to businesses that meet the criteria for a small business 
concern to be eligible for business loans under regulations established by the Small Business 
Administration under" 13 C.F.R. pt. 121, subject to other additional conditions). 
209. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 184I(c)(2)(F)(i)-(iv) (2006), limiting availability of the 
credit card small business lending exemption to 
[a]n institution, including an institution that accepts collateral for extensions of 
credit by holding deposits under $100,000, and by other means which-
(i) engages only in credit card operations; 
(ii) does not accept demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw 
by check or similar means for payment to third parties or others; 
(iii) does not accept any savings or time deposit of less than $100,000; [and] 
(iv) maintains only one office that accepts deposits .... 
These conditions are cumulative, and therefore limit the applicability of the credit card bank 
exception in§ 1841 (c)(2)(F)(v). See supra note 208 (describing exception). 
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Finally, DFA § 1421 mandated a GAO study and report to determine 
the effects of the Act "on the availability and affordability of credit for 
[among others] small businesses;mo a set of issues obviously not predeter-
mined by the sponsors, and perhaps little more than a hope. In fact, given 
the elongated implementation process in relation to many of the Dodd-
Frank mandates, and the complexity of provisions, the GAO has expressed 
considerable caution-if not outright pessimism-about the likelihood that 
a definitive study could be completed at this relatively early stage in DF A 
implementation. The GAO explained, 
Because regulations governing implementation of these provisions are still being 
developed, the criteria we assessed could change based on rulemakers' review of 
comments from the pubhc on the proposed rules .... Partly for this reason, as-
sessing the potential impact of the Dodd-Frank Act provisions is challenging at this 
time.211 
III. ADDRESSING SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS 
The impact of the fmancial crisis and the ambivalent effects of the 
government response have created serious and continuing risks for the small 
business sector. This is a critical issue. As the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York stated in October 2010, 
Small businesses are vital to supporting the economic recovery. Small firms em-
ploy nearly half of all Americans, account for about 60 percent of gross job crea-
tion, and historically have created more jobs than larger firms at the start of eco-
nomic recoveries. Yet recent contractions in business borrowing may be limiting 
the capacity of small businesses to play this critical role. As policymakers and 
stakeholders pursue measures to support sustainable lending to creditworthy firms, 
questions arise about how much of the credit decline may be attributed to weaker 
demand for loans; how much reflects weakened applicant quality; and how much is 
due to restricted credit availability .212 
Neglected in favor of "too big to fail" financial services institutions 
during the early improvised stages of the government response, the sector 
often seems lost in the details of the programmatic initiatives of DF A. In-
deed, a July 2011 study by Celent, a financial institutions research and advi-
sory firm, predicts an accelerating concentration of U.S. deposits among the 
largest banks and a corresponding rapid decline in community banks.213 Yet 
a pervasive recovery from the crisis must include the revitalization of the 
210. DFA § 1421(a). 
211. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNT ABILITY OFFICE, supra note 68, at 4. 
212. Access to Credit: Poll Evidence from Small Businesses, FACTS & TRENDS, Oct. 
2010, at I (footnote omitted), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/regionaV 
2010_Facts_Trends_ Vol_3_2.pdf. 
213. BART NARTER, CELENT, IT TAKES MORE THAN A VILLAGE REDUX (2011), availa-
ble at http://image.exct.net/lib/ffil21672706400/d/ I /morethanavillageredux.pdf. 
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small business sector if the recovery hopes to be deep-rooted. There are 
avenues available to reach this desired result, and many of them would in-
volve existing supervisory and regulatory authority. 
By way of conclusion and as an invitation to further reflection, I 
would suggest the following measures as promising the needed revitaliza-
tion of the sector. First, the federal depository institutions regulators need to 
resolve to invoke the Community Reinvestment Act (CRAY' 4 aggressively 
to encourage depository institutions to give greater focus to the credit needs 
of small businesses in the communities that they serve. 
Second, the regulators have broad statutory enforcement and compli-
ance powers/' 5 virtually untouched by DFA,216 to take enforcement action 
against unsafe and unsound banking practices and violations of laws, rules, 
and regulations. These powers, firmly committed to the broad discretion of 
the regulators in their application,217 could be activated to address a wide 
range of questionable practices by depository institutions that impact small 
business customers. 
Third, the regulators should give high priority to the timely and effec-
tive implementation of Dodd-Frank mandates such as those identified in the 
previous subsection of this Article.218 In March 2011, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben S. Bemanke assured the national convention of the Inde-
pendent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) that the needs of commu-
214. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (2011). For analysis of the CRA, see I MALLOY, supra 
note 2, § 2.05; see also David Evan Cohen, Comment, The Community Reinvestment Act-
Asset or Liability?, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 599 (1992); Michael E. Schrader, Competition and 
Convenience: The Emerging Role of Community Reinvestment, 67 IND. L.J. 331 (1992). 
215. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786, 1818 (formal enforcement powers of National 
Credit Union Administration and banking regulators). For analysis of these powers, see 
Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself.· Revising and Reshaping the En-
forcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1117 (1989) (discussing the 
formal enforcement powers of the federal depository institutions regulators); Stephen K. 
Huber, Enforcement Powers of the Federal Banking Agencies, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 123 
( 1988) (exhaustive discussion of range of state and federal criminal and formal and informal 
civil enforcement authorities). 
216. Cf DFA, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 172(b), 362(3), 363(3), 367(7), 1090(1), 124 
Stat. 1376, 1439, 1549-52, 1557, 2093-94 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786(g)(7), 1818, 
1818(t)). 
217. See, e.g., Groos Nat' I Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 896-
97 (5th Cir. 1978) (extensions of credit by bank in violation of written agreement with OCC 
constituted unsafe and unsound practices); Wachtel v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d 
581 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (order for restitution of failed bank's asset deficit requires showing of 
recklessness or unjust enrichment under§ 1818(b)(6)(a)); Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435 
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 970 (1992) (discussing§ 1818(c)(l)); Greenberg v. 
Comptroller of the Currency, 938 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1991) (OCC suit against director after 
separation from service). But see Gulf Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank 
Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 264 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982) (limiting 
discretion). 
218. See supra Section II.B. 
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nity banks would be factored into the Federal Reserve's DFA rulemaking 
and into new capital rules under the Basel III framework. 219 Yet little tangi-
ble progress has materialized since then. While the regulatory responsibili-
ties imposed by DFA are certainly weighty, a proper sense of what man-
dates are critical, as well as feasible, should lead the regulators to take steps 
to ensure that the operations of depository institutions support a recovery of 
the small business sector, and with it a sustainable recovery for the general 
economy. 
219. Stephen Siciliano, Bernanke Assures Community Bankers on Dodd-Frank Act 
Rulemaking, Basel Ill, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar. 24, 2011, at D9 (reporting on Bemanke 
speech). 
